

called a "jewel
seal" which he
at which he

On November 23 Helms outlined the Agency's ~~responsibility~~ investigative responsibility [SSC, Book I, p25]. At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexico, Central America, and Panama, in charge of the Agency's initial investigative efforts. [HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-112, Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p 10]. Scelso asserted that he was charged with the investigation ~~on the basis of two factors.~~ ~~of~~ ~~of~~ ~~of~~ ~~of~~. First, he had prior experience in conducting ~~intelligence~~ CIA security investigations and secondly, Oswald had ~~been~~ ~~recently~~ ~~been~~ ~~observed~~ ~~in Mexico by CIA surveillance,~~ ~~already~~ ^{Scelso's} operational concern. [SSC Book I, p25, HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-112] *
[Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp 9-10]

* Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research & Analyses for the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, ~~described~~ Scelso's responsibility ~~not as a~~ ~~immediate~~ ~~to investigate but to "coordinate"~~ rather traffic (code facilitation, telegram & telegraphic coordination) for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world ..." [HSCA Class. Depo of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p 9].

deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p 15 wherein Rocca states that responsibility shifted from Scelso to C1 Staff on January 12, 1964). Helms testified that this shift in responsibility was a logical development because the investigation had begun to ~~latch~~ on broader lines.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p 14, see also HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138)

Raymond Rocca expanded on Helms reasoning when he testified before the Committee that the shift in responsibility was partially ~~caused by~~ caused by the establishment of the Warren Commission. (HSCA Clas. Depo of Raymond Rocca, pp 12-13) Rocca added to his reasoning:

it was entirely appropriate in the GPFL OOR place that he (Scelso) would have that responsibility for the Agency investigation. But the minute you had a Commission set up outside the line obviously had to (cont)

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be the Director, and from the Director
to his Chief of Operations overseas,
because the spread involved then all
of the division. Here you had Mr.
[Whitten]²⁶ being asked to sign off
on cables that had to do with the
Netherlands, with U.K., with
Australia, and it would have seemed
to me utterly administratively
simply a hybrid monstrosity. ^{HSCA 6005. File Dep. of} Rocco ^{2/17/58}

P 12

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Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

However, [REDACTED] instances, lacking the ~~exp-~~
[REDACTED] concern for protecting its
[REDACTED] the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting [REDACTED] relevant information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's [REDACTED] effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods did [REDACTED] have effect [REDACTED] the quality of the information to [REDACTED] the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) In some instances, as a result the Agency would make unilateral decisions [REDACTED] from withhold or limit access to CIA materials to be [REDACTED] the Commission. (See so dep. p.158)

Two areas of concern to this Committee in which the protection of agency sources and methods were an issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved and impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:

- 1) [REDACTED] with holding information from the Warren Commission Staff pertaining to the photosurveillance and telephone surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station
- 2) As a related consideration, the controversy sur-

The Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods is impeded at the Warren Commission investigation. These are:

rounding photograph now referred to as that
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined [redacted]
herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.

p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

CIA
The policy [redacted] limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

phone taps, in order to protect your continuing ~~OPS~~. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence/^{Special Investigations Group} Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~men~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico. Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City, see CIA SCI-3/779/510) O'Neal's memorandum ^{shows} [redacted] that he discussed this matter with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI-sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

was to be in a form that would
the form of this presentation [redacted] be such [redacted] pro-
tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.
(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during *after Commission's work,* the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City. [redacted]

[redacted] Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the [Mexican authori-
ties] and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, [redacted])

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period [redacted]. Furthermore, as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council's Director McGeorge Bundy, [redacted] aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these taps Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. *{cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy}*

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unwillingness

The CIA's [redacted] to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations [redacted].
[redacted] in the early stages of its investigation [redacted] the transmission of [redacted] conversations and those of certain Soviet and Cuban [redacted]. This is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of the Agency's part to [redacted].
[redacted] CIA felt uncomfortable substance [redacted] generated information [redacted] provided the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep.) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the Commission.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visits during September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum did not mention [redacted] that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum did not mention [redacted] fact that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

Armas

On February 1, 1964 Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that at least as of ~~the 10th~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in # of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations.

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission or indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

V. During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief ^{Scott} of Station in Mexico City. ~~He~~ provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: _____ P)
However, prior to ~~April 9~~ it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephon~~c~~ surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals [REDACTED] the Warren Commission had learned that CIA [REDACTED] possessed~~ed~~ transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

Dorticos-Armas
The~~s~~ conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, [REDACTED] concerned Silvia Durma's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (cite?). [REDACTED] Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, [REDACTED] that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives' to review [REDACTED] this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

Supra
(Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions concerning Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary [redacted] of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephone intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ~~★ Insert p 28~~

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion was based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. ~~This memorandum bears~~ ~~no~~

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, ~~Slawson~~ had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis ~~should~~ have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

Insert from p27

As ~~on~~ March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. ~~The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary police report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:~~

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that ~~Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three~~

*Insert p29

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican Police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1072) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning was ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as ~~was~~ Oswald ^{the CIA had twice} at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ~~on two specific occasions~~ ^{were} definitely established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy ~~were~~ established as the result of the telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they articulated one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) *Coleman and Slawson wrote:*

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts refer to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed.

(Item I)

The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson ~~had~~ found it necessary to request ~~Memorandum~~ the source of the information, he had not been

by the CIA

provided that source which in this case [redacted] telephone
intercept material.

(Item Number Two) the above listing)

The first Coleman-Slawson request [redacted] tends to show [redacted] the Commission [redacted] that they [redacted] had [redacted] given access, [redacted] to [redacted] intercepts concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request Agency transcripts could well have interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, [item number three of the above listing] reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies [redacted] discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. At the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Cite.)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance operations and English translations of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. Scott indicated that his staff ~~at that point~~ began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22).

Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded ■

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote
Thomas Karamessines Assistant DDP
to [REDACTED], regarding the
circumstances [REDACTED] by which [REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin [REDACTED] requested that
the Commission be [REDACTED] told the identity of the individual
depicted in the photograph if that information [REDACTED] was available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,
Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret
Services that the CIA had disseminated several reports or
communications concerning the assassination to the Secret
Service since November 22, 1963. Rankin requested copies of these
reports and other materials. Three CIA cables that were
concerned with the photograph of the individual [REDACTED] originally identified
by the Mexico City Station as [REDACTED] Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.

After [REDACTED] dissemination, among the materials
disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26
dissemination (DIR85177), a copy of which was transmitted to
the Secret Service. That cable concerned the Dor [REDACTED]-Armas
conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic
surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the
assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances
surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission
of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964.

~~The~~ *had unknowingly requested* ~~which the Warren Commission~~ *needed access to a source of concern to the CIA.* ~~preceding section), the~~ *Similarly disclosure* ~~of the photosurveillance operations,~~ *to the Warren Commission had begun* ~~the~~ *to cause concern within the Agency.*

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..."

(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

VIII. Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, fo[REDACTED] is

for [REDACTED], in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may also [REDACTED] be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assassination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612). Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ~~station~~ and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Commercial Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City (Dispatch HMMW 11935). ** insert*

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first ~~reported by~~ ^{recorded by} the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, ~~John~~ ^{Joseph Langosch}, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, ~~had~~ ^{reported} the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

** This dispatch reported what
CIA*

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 ~~had~~ was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told ~~Grenson~~ Langosch as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." (cite May 5 memo)

~~Grenson~~ Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, ~~shortly after the assassination~~ ^{during January 1963} for Cuba shortly after the assassination (cite May 5 memo)

On May 7, 1964, ~~S~~ Langosch recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

Langosch
On May 8 [REDACTED] further disclosed AMMUG's know-
ledge of the Oswald case. *Langosch* [REDACTED] paraphrased AMMUG's
knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information [REDACTED] had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/l situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

LANGOSCH
[REDACTED]

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing." (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of ~~██████████~~ Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth. However, that attachment makes no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested access to as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, ██████████ the questions used in ██████████'s interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willens' review. Willens saw ██████████'s May 5 memorandum. The only mention of Alderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964. However, Willens was not shown the ██████████ memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

continued after p 51

Calderon

Need a better transition into this section.

As discussed in an earlier section of this report,

the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's production from its telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City until an advanced stage in its investigation. The record reflects that Messrs. Willens, Slawson, ^{from CIA surveillance operations} and Coleman did not review the production until they visited Mexico City on April 9, 1964. At that time, they reviewed a number of ^{telephone} intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. These intercepts included one call to the Soviet Embassy on September 27, believed to have been made by Oswald, two calls made by Silvia Duran from the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassy, made by an unidentified caller. (Cite Salawson memo of April 21, 1964.)

On September 28 the intercept operation recorded a call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate. (Cite.)

On October 1 the intercept operation recorded two calls made by a person later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.)

The Commission representatives were also supplied with the CIA intercepts of ~~two~~ two conversations that transpired between the Cuban President Dorticos and the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been

*It's very hard for
me to see what
point is being
made or few pages.*

offered money while at the Cuban Embassy, and the general state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22, 1964, pp. 45-46).

*which
memo?
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reader
to remember
it.*

The Committee's

A review of CIA files ~~indicates~~ corroborates ~~Slawson's~~ ^{memorandum regarding} recounting of the telephone intercepts provided to and reviewed by the Commission. ~~One~~ One CIA document, a blind memorandum ~~is~~ entitled "Material from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These included three ^{of the} conversations ~~conversations~~ September 27 listed above, one call of September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of

*Why not
just
say
+ let
agency
has
a chance
+ the
Calderon
was
not to
give it
over to
WCC.*

October ? - ^{check} ~~Document~~ ^{document} ←

While this does not correspond to the listing of calls set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish that no calls ~~made on~~ November 22, 1963 were shown to the Warren Commission.

In addition, this document corroborates the showing of the two Dorticas-Armas conversations of November 26, 1964 ^{to the Warren Commission}.

The Committee has queried former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren

Calderon

and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed ~~had~~ to be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. ~~for~~ It would demonstrate that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to Cuban Intelligence, ^{the} ~~Services~~ and that Services' possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

true
but
sound a
bit
stiff.
try
to modify.

Regarding Calderon's possible association with the CIA,

the Committee has examined Calderon's file. ~~the~~ ^{the} Agency

files reviewed reveal no ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part:

... Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be in a position to follow up on this lead... Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity.

(HMMW/1935, Sept. 1, 1963)

Has
CIA
formally
been
asked
about
this?

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear. (HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidence an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

The Committee has queried the author of the above-cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section."

David Ronis, the ~~dispatch's author~~, was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was ~~then~~ responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. ~~After~~ he would receive no

[What purpose is served by this sentence?]

response to these requests.] It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August 31, 1978)

Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August 9, 1978, p. 136; Rocca, Dep. p.148, July 17, 1978; *Langosch*, Interview of August ___, Piccolo, Interview of ___.)

*Should
make
found
myself
for
written
response*

Thus, the Agency's file^{Calderon} and the testimony of former CIA employees reveal^{have} no connection ~~to~~ Calderon ~~to~~ the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete, ~~absence from Calderon's 261 folder~~ the most glaring omission being the ~~testimony of~~ Calderon's ~~key~~ cryptic remarks following the assassination of President Kennedy.

to lawyerly

As cited with regard to Luisa Calderon, a defector from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the DGI on April 21, 1964 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (OTTA IN 68894, 24 April 64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H. Langosch, went to Canada to meet A-1, debrief him, and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States.

(See supra cite.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff from the Chief of Station in Ottawa, Canada. Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. (Contract Approving Officer memo, 6 May 64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency.

He stated:

There is no question in my mind that AMMUG-1

*It is now known that A-1 did provide significant leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is further apparent that little of this information was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission. Therefore, the possibility exists that A-1 had provided other information to the CIA that was relevant to the Warren Commission's work but ~~that which~~ was not properly reported to the Commission.

is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B (OTTA IN 68894 24 April 64). ^{which} ~~This section~~ was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April 64)

Identified for the CIA
A-1 knew who were the Cuban ~~Intelligence officers~~ assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he initially identified Alfredo Mirabal, Manuel Vega, and Rogelio Rodriguez and the Commercial attache as DGI officers posted at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debriefing of A-1, 30 April 64)

This is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case."

(Dispatch UFGW-5035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a

CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Cite supra.)

Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has

worked extensively with the Agency files system believed ^{told a Committee}
~~staff member that was the symbol for known as~~
this notation ~~to stand for~~ the CIA component Special In-

Has CIA been asked to know in writing to issue? who?
✓ telligence. Other CIA representatives believed the nota-
tion to stand for the CIA component Social Intelligence.

Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated _____, it ~~as~~ stated

Quote Barbara's memo.

The Agency has been unable to locate this document and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-1's case officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied ~~regarding~~ ^{about} Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August 21, 1978) he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not ^{interview}

In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that ~~AMW~~^{A-1} provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the

(Give background information on separation from CIA)
Committee has attempted to locate AMMUG. The CIA has also attempted to locate AMMUG (give date of separation from CIA) but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts.

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information AMMUS may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. ^{and} ~~but on~~ On the basis of CIA's ^{with whom} written record the Agency, except ^{an} ~~for~~ the Calderon episode, provided the Warren Commission with all information

however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. Even considering the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was not disclosed ^{Giving due consideration to} ~~prevented~~ foreclosed the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1

*Note
Source
Paul L.
Conferences
Present in
Nosenko
Case we
not available
here*

a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the ~~possibility of exercising this~~ option. ~~It should not~~ have done so. ~~CIA~~ The CIA did not fail, in A-1's case, the enormous problems establishing bona fide as it did with Nosenko.

I see your last sentence didn't fit this. Good,

~~Definitely~~ In light of the establishment of A-1's bone fide^s (Cite Langosch's quote supra), his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, ~~this~~ option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission if shown, at the very least, had the opportunity for such consideration.

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

See also Angleton file.

However, [] instances, listing the concern for protecting its sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting [] information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods did [] affect [] the quality of the information to [] which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) In some instances as a result the Agency would make unilateral decisions regarding the release of CIA materials to the Commission. (See also dep. p.158) At some point, you should refer to testimony by CIA people who acknowledged this from a withhold or limit Two areas of concern in this Committee in which the protection of agency sources and methods were an issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved and impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:

- 1) [] Withholding information from the Warren Commission pertaining to the photosurveillance and telephone surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station effects of the
- 2) As a related consideration, the controversy sur Get better phrasing. Also, this is not really a separate area of concern.

This Committee has identified two areas of concern which the Agency has protected the Warren Commission investigation from a withhold or limit

ambiguous & probably unnecessary. Also, it does not equate posed because, if it took CIA 3 months to process in response to a request, the one week transmittal time is meaningless.

rounding photograph now referred to as that
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined [redacted]
herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.

p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

CIA
The policy [redacted] limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

phone taps, in order to protect your continuing ~~ops~~. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA cable DIR 97829 F01A 498-204, 29Jan1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence/^{Special Investigations Group} Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~man~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of ^{that had been} December 9, 1963, submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico, ^{and asked him} Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City, see CIA SCI-3/779/510) O'Neal's memorandum ^{shows} ~~recalls~~ that he discussed this matter with Scelso, who, in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

*his portion of
sentence
not follow
in light of
in the public
point issue*

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI-- sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

appropriately

which would - 22 - was to be in a form that would
the form of this presentation [redacted] be [redacted] pro-
tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec. 63)

See also: Angleton files.

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City. [redacted]

[redacted] Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities [redacted] and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, [redacted])

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period [redacted]. Furthermore (SCI 3/779/510 11/4/64) as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council

Director McGeorge Bundy, [redacted] aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these taps Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. [cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]

This acts against
point you're
seeking to
make. It
points out
on WH & NSC

1/20

The CIA's ~~unwillingness~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations [REDACTED] ^{to us} [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the early stages of the investigation [REDACTED] the transmission of [REDACTED] conversations and those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information [REDACTED] provided the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep.) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the commission. We'll have to give example. i.e. WC was proceeding on completely mistaken assumption re LHO in MC prior to MC trip by WC personnel in April. I believe this was in the WC 3/30 Session memo.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum did not mention [REDACTED] that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum did not mention [REDACTED] that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that his writing, at least as of the time of his letter, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in # of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. Good point.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations.

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did neither reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission nor indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

v. *title? - shouldn't this be a subsection of the telephone tape?*

found! During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief - why? Please *Slawson, Willens* that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief *Scott* of Station in Mexico City, ~~who~~ provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: P)

However, prior to ~~the~~ *April 9,* it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephon~~e~~ surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals [redacted] the Warren Commission had learned that CIA [redacted] possessed [redacted] transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. ~~Dorticos-Armas~~ The [redacted] conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, [redacted] concerned Silvia Durna's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (cite?). ^{memo} [redacted] Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, [redacted] stating that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review [redacted] this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

^{Supra} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocca's testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions concerning Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary ~~of~~ of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephone intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ~~X~~ Insert p 28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion wrote was he wrote is based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears no connection to Oswald

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, [redacted] Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis [redacted] should have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or ^{above cited} criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

Insert from p.27

*Insert p.29

As on March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. As Slawson reveals, ^{As Slawson reveals, CIA} ^{linguist} ^{suspect of a} forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary police report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1972) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning is ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as ~~Oswald~~ ^{suspect} at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ~~he had twice~~ ~~occasions~~ ~~had~~ definitely established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy ~~were~~ established as the result of the telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

What about the conversations?
4:16 pm

could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception, but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they ^{awkwardly} articulated one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) *Coleman and Slawson wrote:*

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts ~~refer~~ to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed
by (item)

The question initially posed in the above-referenced

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April

22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). *Obviously*, necessarily, if Slawson ~~had~~ found it

necessary to request ~~the~~ the source of the information, he had not been

This should be combined
in one report.

as yet

~~to the CIA~~~~provided that source which in this case is the telephone~~~~interviewed him~~~~confidential~~

(Item Number Two) the above listing

~~because state officials~~ The first Coleman-Slawson request [redacted] tends to show the Commission that they did not have given access, [redacted] to [redacted] intercepts concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request Agency transcripts could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, [item number three of the above listing] reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. At the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Cite.)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance operations ^{ACCOMPANIED WITH} ~~for lawyerly type language~~ and English translations ^{of the same.} In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, ^{immediately} Scott indicated that his staff ~~at that point~~ began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22).

^{that} Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents ^{were} ~~had~~ immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded ~~—~~

What point of view?

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit."

(p. 24) *of what?*

*What
for
this
add.*

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining, respectively, to the Duran and Oswald conversations. *Sort of period Sept 27-Oct 1, 1963.*

Great!

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's *accurately reasoned* ability to draw conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City, *[redacted]*. It meant that as of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials *could have been made* available for analysis by the Commission.

The preceding section (III) was labeled telephone & photo surveillance, yet there was almost no treatment of photo surveillance. We do have organizational problem. Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with the vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement.)

- Shouldn't altera conversation

be in this section?

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son. This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. This photograph was one in a series [REDACTED] resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. It had been linked by the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination, to Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (Circle Helms affidavit in WCR)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153) WCR II?

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to ~~Thomas Karamessines Assistant DDP~~ regarding both ~~the circumstances~~ ^{and an explanation of the} ~~for which~~ ^{had been disseminated} this photograph by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin ~~had requested that the Commission be informed of the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph if that information was available.~~

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,

Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret Services that ~~the CIA had disseminated several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret Service since November 22, 1963.~~ Rankin requested copies of these reports and other materials. Three ~~cables that were originally identified~~ concerned with the photograph of the individual ~~which~~ ^{by the Mexico City Station as} Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother. ~~what was shown to his wife? - the lot to a~~ ^{to} ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~in~~ ^{which} ~~was delivered~~

~~unbeknownst to Rankin~~ among the materials disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), a copy of which was transmitted to the Secret Service. That cable concerned the Dor~~o~~-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

as what?
What additional
relevant point
is being made?

This could be combined into a sentence

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964:

~~The~~ ~~Commission~~ ~~had unknowingly requested~~ ~~the need for access to~~ ~~a source of concern to the CIA.~~
~~telephonic surveillance production~~ ~~(as discussed in the~~ ~~unclear what is the~~
~~preceding section), the~~ ~~of the photosurveillance operations,~~ ~~some of~~
~~to the Warren Commission had begun~~ ~~concern~~
~~the~~ ~~also~~ ~~to cause concern within~~
the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

*(check)
The public
agency to agency
Rocca
letter, if
this particular
letter is just
a draft
2/27/64*
"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..."
(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

VIII. Luisa Calderon

- 43 -
*This should be included in an
earlier section on the taps.*

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

awkward
"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, fo [REDACTED] is

for [REDACTED] in response to
a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on
a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President

Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? boastful ex post facto
suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the
only item in the intercept coverage of the
Cubans and Soviets after the assassination
that contains the suggestion of foreknow-
ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS,
23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com-
ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in-
deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may
also [REDACTED] be interpreted without such a sinister impli-
cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the
Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did
merit serious attention in the months following the assas-
sination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported
to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ~~Section~~^{to} and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of ~~the~~ Station in Mexico City (Dispatch HMMW 11935). ~~insert~~

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, Harold Swenson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

* This dispatch reported what:
(over)

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

Swenson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, *December 1964*, for Cuba.

On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. Swenson paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/l situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Swenson's May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ^{where} ~~are~~ set forth. However, that attachment ^{made} ~~makes~~ no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested ^{access to} as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to ~~look at~~ the questions used in Swenson's interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willens' review. Willens saw Swenson's May 5 memorandum. The only mention of ~~A~~ Calderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." However, Willens was not shown the Swenson memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

~~At other times~~
However, in ~~other instances~~, risking the expo-
~~sure~~ ~~concern for protecting its~~
the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused
the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty
in getting ~~relevant~~ information than when the protection of
such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin
expressed the opinion that the Agency's ~~effort~~ to pro-
tect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not have~~
~~effect on~~ the quality of the information to ~~which~~
the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

~~the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.~~

J.Lee 8/17/79
Franklin at p.23) In some instances as a result the

Agency would make unilateral decisions, according to ~~the~~ ~~withholding~~

~~access to C/A~~ by HSCA Classified Agent John
~~material~~ to be ~~submitted~~ the Commission. (See also dep. 5/16/78)

p.158) ... Sp... t... , please who acknowledged this:

Two areas of concern to this Committee in which the

protection of aging sources and methods were used during

ing the Warren Commission investigation involved in

peded The Warren Commission investigation to some degree.

- 1) ~~Withholding information from the Warren Commission~~
pertaining to the photosurveillance and telephone surveillance
operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station

! 2) As a related consideration, the ~~controversy~~ ^{effect of the} Agency's reticence to reveal
get better phrasing. Also, this is ^{not} ~~not~~
merely a separate area of concern.

The origin of
~~rounding~~ photograph now referred to as that
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined [redacted]

[herein.]

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the ~~inception~~ of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (*Ibid* ~~Scelso dep.~~)

But ~~and~~ *p. 158)* Scelso further testified that:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts. (~~Ext to Scelso quote, all of p. 5~~)

Ibid
Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

CIA
The policy [redacted] limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

{
31 January 1964, memorandum for J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms}
CIA FOIA Document # 509-803}

phone taps, in order to protect your continuing op^s. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID
(CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29 Jan 1964)

CIA FoIA Doc # 498-204, 20 Dec 1963, DIR 97829
426-757 90466

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 20, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence/ Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison man to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of ~~that had been~~ Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico, ~~Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with~~ source of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City, see CIA SCI 3/779/510) O'Neal's memorandum ^{shows} indicated that he discussed this matter with Scelso, ~~who informed him~~, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI-sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald), Birch O'Neal, in C/S/Office materials]

Proprietary

which would - 22 -
the form of this presentation ~~be used~~ to pro-
tect ~~of~~ the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)
Ibid.

See also: Ayleton Slope.

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during ~~of the Commission's~~, the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City. ~~in~~

~~CIA~~ Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authori-^{ties} and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States. ^{Richard Helms, 8/9/78} and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session ^{PP 51-52} hearing, pp. 51-52, ~~and~~)

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period. ^(SAC 13779/510 11/11/64) Furthermore, as

of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council Director McGeorge Bundy, ^{had been made} aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these taps Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. ^[cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]

11/10

unwillingness

The CIA's ~~refusal~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations [REDACTED] ^{in the early stages of the investigation} [REDACTED] ^{the Agency's} ~~transmissions~~ ^{of information} and ~~communications~~ ^{its} ~~and those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials~~ is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an ~~Agency~~ ^{policy designed to skew in its favor the form and} ~~tur~~ ^{the} ~~the Agency's part to~~ ^{information} ~~the~~ ^{the CIA felt uncomfortable.} substance ~~of~~ ^{generated} information ~~was provided~~ ^(See HSCA classified deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, P158) the Warren Commission. (See ~~Scelso dep't~~) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it.

~~facts~~ even those which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the Commission. *We'll have to give specifics.* ^{I.e. We were proceeding on} ~~the Commission~~ ^{mistaken assumption}

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA ^{misled} provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that ^{assumption} chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit~~s~~ during ^{re LHD} September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum ^{in W.C.} did ^{MC} not mention ~~of~~ ^{that} Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum ^{MC trip} did ^{not} mention ~~the~~ fact that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Ambassador ^{by} Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and ^{2nd} ^{Armed Forces} transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. {CIA FOIA Doc # 498-204, 29 Jan 1964, DIR 97829} On Febrary 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that at least as of ~~the time~~, his writing, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in paragraph 1 of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. *Good point.*

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations. {Tbid}

HSCA classif. redep. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, P89

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did neither reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission nor indicate that ~~this~~ would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). [Ibid]

IV A

During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, who provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to Mexico City)

However, prior to April 9 it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephone surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals

~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had intercepts~~ possessed ~~had~~ transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

~~Dorticos-Armas~~
The ~~conversations~~ conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms,

~~concerned~~ concerned Silvia Durfa's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (cite?). ~~On that date~~ Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, ~~saying~~ that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives to review ~~this~~ this material. (Slawson memo, ^{memo} [Apr. 123, 1964 pp 3, 19, 45-46] March 12, 1964) ↗

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

^{Supra} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions ^{Concerning} ~~concerning~~ Oswald's Mexico trip, ~~that he had reached~~ were derived from CIA memoranda ~~of~~ of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, (Slawson memorandum March 25, 1964) and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary ~~of~~ of P²⁰ interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. [Ibid]

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephone intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ~~Insert p 28~~

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 [CD 692] (Later) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion ^(Ibid p 2) ~~writes~~ he ~~writes~~ is based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. ~~This memorandum bears~~ ^{On} ~~On~~ ^{no}

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, [redacted] Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis [redacted] should have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or ^{above cited} criticism of the Mexican police summary report. ^{# Insert p29}

Insert from p27

As on March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. ^{As Slawson reveals,} The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations and a summary ^{suspect} ~~issued by the Mexican Federal Police~~ ~~report~~. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144) ↓

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1972) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning was ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. [Slawson memorandum of April 10, 1964, Subj: Intercept from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City, P-2] Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate subsequently stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, [Ibid, p 45] the CIA had twice occasion [redacted] definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy were established as the result of the [Tb. 1] telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they ~~articulated~~ posed one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts refer to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed [I bid]

The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 21, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson found it

necessary to request never — the source of the information, he had not been

as yet

~~access to the original material~~
~~provided that source which in this case is the telephone~~
~~intercepted by the CIA~~

The first Coleman-Slawson request [redacted] tends to show the Commission [redacted] that they [redacted] had given access, [redacted] to [redacted] intercepts concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request Agency transcripts could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, Item number three of the above list, reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. At the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Cite) [Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964] Subj: Conference with CIA on March 12, 1964

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. SI b. 1 pp 9-10

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance operations and English translations ~~of the transcripts~~ ^{of the transcripts} ~~of the same~~. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances

David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1969, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. Scott indicated that his staff ~~at that point~~ began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p. 22) SI b. 1
reflex for memo
Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents ~~were~~ ^{that} had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit."

*100-247157
4/22/67*

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining, respectively, to the Duran and Oswald conversations. *Scot's period Sept 27 - Oct 1, 1963.*
Slawson memorandum, Apr. 21, 1964, SAW: Tel. intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban embassies, Mexico City.
It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw *conclusions* ^{*accurately reasoned*} regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City. *[redacted]* It meant that as of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials *could have been made* available for analysis by the Commission. *[redacted]*

The preceding section - 35 - does not appear to pertain to the Commission's investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It is more relevant to the CIA's early policy of not providing the Commission with the vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement.)

~~II~~ Mexico City Mystery Man

FBI Special Agent Odum showed
On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown [redacted] ^{to in this section?}
FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son. ^{(Warren Commission Report p-} This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. ^{CIA Doc DDP4-1555, 25th} This photograph ¹⁹⁶⁴ was one in a series [redacted] ^{the} [redacted] resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. ^{it} It had been linked by the Mexico City Station ^(ibid) prior to the assassination, ^(ibid) Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. ^(Warren Commission Report p-7) [Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms p-7]

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. ^{(Warren Commission Report p-} Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. ^(p. 153) [WCR 13]

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote
Thomas Karranen his Assistant DDP
to [REDACTED] regarding the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] circumstances [REDACTED] of this photograph by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin [REDACTED] requested that

the Commission be informed of the identity of the individual
depicted in the photograph if that information was available.

[REDACTED] Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc # - 3

On that same day, in a separate letter, to DCI McCone,
Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret
Services that the CIA had disseminated several reports or
communications concerning the assassination to the Secret

Service since November 22, 1963. Rankin requested copies of these

reports and other materials. Three [REDACTED] cables of [REDACTED]
concerned with the photograph of the individual [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

by the Mexico City Station as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Letter of
[REDACTED] Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

unlawfully obtained [REDACTED] among the materials
by the CIA

disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] dissemination [REDACTED], a copy of which was transmitted to
the Secret Service. That cable concerned the Dor [REDACTED] Armas

conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic
surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the
assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. Thus the CIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] faced a problem in making the material disseminated to the
Secret Service available to the Commission for inspection. The Agency would have to use
John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission
of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

*of John S/16/78
HSCA Classif. ex DPPS (Scelso ~~disclosure~~, p. 150)
By February 12, 1964.*

The [redacted] with the Warren Commission [redacted] had unknowingly requested [redacted] access to [redacted] a source of concern to the CIA co-telephonic surveillance production (as discussed in the [redacted] considering the risks of exposing its position similarly disclosure [redacted] unclear what is the preceding section), the [redacted] of the photosurveillance operations, to the Warren Commission had begun [redacted] concern [redacted] the [redacted] to cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

JFK Doc

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the [redacted] refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..." *CIA Doc FOIA # 579-250*

(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250) *5 March 64*

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City Section and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending (CIA Doc, DISPATCH JFCA-1005C, 15 July 1963) on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City (CIA Doc Dispatch HMMW 11935, 1 Sept 1963)

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI (CIA Doc, Memorandum of Harold Swanson, FOIA 68-270, 5 May 1964) was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, Harold Swanson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

A. This ~~dispatch~~ reported that:
(over)

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." ^{was} ^{Largosch} ^{Indent} ^(IBID)

^{Largosch} ^{Swenson} thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, ^{during January 1964} ^{within one month of the assassination} for Cuba. ^{for} ^(IBID)

^{Largosch}
On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. ^{CIA Doc F014 687-295, attach. 3, 7 May 1964} ^(IBID)

- Langosch*
- On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. *[Ibid, attach. 5]* Swenson paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...*[Ibid]*

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/l situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

ScIA doc fol A 687-295, Roccamemorandum, 11 May 1966

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with 4 attachments). *[F b d p. 2]*

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. *[CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, Helms memorandum, 15 May 1964]* Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of *Langosch's* *[L a n g o s c h ' s]* Swenson's *[S w e n s o n ' s]* *[F b d]* May 5 memorandum. (*Helms memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294*). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez *were* set forth. However, that attachment *makes* no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested *access to* as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to look at the *Langosch's* questions used in Swenson's interrogation of AMMUG *[CIA Doc FOIA 739-3, Dooley 739-3]*. *memorandum to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310]*. On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willens' review. Willens saw *Langosch's* Swenson's May 5 memorandum. The only mention of *Alderon* was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." *[F b d]* *Langosch's* However, Willens was not shown the Swenson memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible